Russia is trying to profit from China’s plans to attack Taiwan

The analyzes were made by Ivan Kirichevsky for Defense Express. Their assessments, opinions and comments on the topic do not reflect the position of


KYIV, ($1=27.09 Ukrainian Hryvnias) – The Kremlin is seeking large new orders from China for arms supplies. But at the same time, the Russians make the following assessment – if China attacks Taiwan, world trade routes may “fall apart,” and so the Kremlin will “weigh” its financial “airbag” needed for aggression against Ukraine.

The Ukrainian information space is now spinning the concept that Russia and China can literally “synchronize” in the next few months – China will launch an attack on Taiwan, Russia will launch a major offensive at the same time, the US will not pull such a “two-front war”, and Ukraine will lose the Kremlin.

This concept can be denied at least in part if you take at least two pieces of news from the columns of Defense Express. The first – on October 19, 2021, the PLA Eastern District Command “lit up” several dozen old Shenyang J-6 fighters, copies of the Soviet MiG-19, converted into UAVs and designed to “probe” and breakthrough Taiwan’s air defenses.

Second, on November 19, 2021, it became known that Taiwan had launched an upgraded supersonic Yun Feng cruise missile with a range of up to 1,500 km, which could destroy targets deep in the territory of “mainland” China. In a 1-1 draw in absentia, China is forced to look for a new “miracle weapon” to have a decisive advantage over Taiwan.

One can ask the question in another way – to what extent is Russia itself ready to synchronize its aggressive actions with China? The answer to this question can be found in the publication of the Russian “Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies”, published on November 26 this year and posted here at this link.

The content of this publication can be “caught” in literally three theses. CAST experts believe that Russia will not publicly support a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan, at most – Russian diplomacy will make a “neutral” statement “about respect for China’s territorial integrity.” Russia itself does not mind making money on the supply of weapons needed by China to invade the rebellious island.

But at the same time, Russia itself, to put it mildly, is not particularly enthusiastic about the prospect of a possible Chinese attack on Taiwan.

The motive is voiced – Beijing’s armed aggression will break all existing logistical ties; The motive is unspoken – disruption of the logistical ties of world trade, including leaving Russia without the financial “airbag” necessary for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

This CAST publication is valuable for the following reasons. Under authoritarian political regimes, there is no freedom of expression, including on “profile” topics, respectively – the publication of CAST can be considered at least one that corresponds to the mood of the military-political leadership.

The authors of the CAST outlined the “political” framework in which China could attack Taiwan, tried to predict the hypothetical format of China’s war against Taiwan, and this is valuable for predictions that may apply to Ukraine as well. Although it should always be borne in mind that Russians are carriers of “optics”, which is not always true. Then – a more detailed, summary of the publication.

So, the authors of CAST assume that the decision to attack Taiwan, the leadership of communist China may take between the end of 2022 – beginning of 2024.

It is during this period that the final deconstruction of Taiwan’s elite, which tended to support a “one-country-two-regime” course toward peaceful reunification with China, could take place through democratic elections. And also – all of Taiwan’s rearmament programs that can give a new quality to the rebel island’s armed forces – the purchase of 108 Abrams M1A2T tanks, the purchase of at least 100 F-16 fighters of the latest modifications, or the construction of at least five corvettes – are designed for the horizon in 2025. Tuo Chiang catamarans, armed with 16 RCCs at once and nicknamed the “aircraft carrier killer”.

Taiwan’s armed forces number only 187,000 and do not have a tactical advantage even in some areas over mainland Chinese troops.

But on the other hand, Taiwan has systematically invested in the development of its special services and Special Operations Forces, using the popular “political vocabulary” in Ukraine – Taiwan has a strong “deep state” whose existence makes impossible a scenario of “hybrid” annexation of the island, such as occupation. Crimea by Russia in 2014. Therefore, according to the authors of CAST, a full-scale war is the only option in which China will be able to conquer Taiwan.

The Russians assume that China will launch armed aggression against Taiwan in such a scenario.

First – masking preparations under the guise of large-scale maneuvers, then – the transition to large-scale disinformation, the phase of armed aggression – missile and airstrikes across the depths of Taiwan and the establishment of a complete naval blockade of the island.

In turn, Taiwan’s military-political leadership is also breaking the possible direct Chinese invasion into three possible phases. The first is the preservation of forces and means of armed forces from communist China’s planes and missiles, the second is the naval battle between Taiwan’s Mosquito Fleet and Communist China’s landing fleet, and the third is coastal battles aimed at allowing the PLA a maximum of 40 km deep in Taiwan.

Accordingly, the Russians from CAST believe that China is interested in buying the full range of offensive weapons from Russia to prepare for aggression against Taiwan, such as guided missiles, combat helicopters, combat and landing ships, EW systems, and so on.

But then the authors of the CAST seem to break a half-word with the proviso that everything will depend on how operational Beijing will be in bureaucratic terms to deploy a new round of arms purchases in Russia.

Well, at this point, the author of this text makes the following assumption: now the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation has not yet formed an unambiguous attitude to the prospect of a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

On the one hand, arms exports for Russians are a fetish, because they are “non-raw material exports” that do not depend on volatility and, accordingly, give the Kremlin more stable incomes, including for the war against Ukraine. And in this perspective, China’s preparation for war against Taiwan could give the Russians direct economic benefits.

On the other hand, China may move to direct preparations for an invasion of Taiwan without large-scale arms purchases from Russia.

Then the Kremlin’s China’s war against Taiwan becomes unprofitable, because at the same time the logistics chains, including the supply of raw materials by sea, such as ore or oil, maybe “sprinkled” and, accordingly, the Russian treasury will begin to lose revenue catastrophically.

Accordingly, monitoring the security situation in the Pacific region, in particular around Taiwan, even from the position of a profile observer, is directly in the interests of Ukraine’s national security.

The more data there is on Russia’s position on possible aggressive plans for communist China, the greater the “room for maneuver” for our state.


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